It has not been verified that Nathaniel was the son of Nathan butbecau se he was born in the same area as Nathan's children, is placehere unt il his parentage has been found.
Residences & events:
9/18/1850 McKean, Licking Co, OH. Listed in that census were NathanC hilcothe, 34, Elizabeth, 37, Mary, 13, William, 10, Prudence A, 7,John , 5, and Allen, 2, all born in PA. Nathan was a laborer but didhave $ 1000 in real estate. In various townships of the same countywere othe r Chilcote families headed by those born in MD & PA,including: Micah, S arah, Eliza, and Mordica.
8/3/1860 Bedford, PO Canal Lewisville, Coshocton Co, OH. The censust aker recorded him as N G Chilcote, 44, with wife Elisabeth, 48, andsev eral children: Mary S, 21, Anne, 18, William, 20, John, 16,Allen, 12, D avid, 10, and Emory, 8, all born in PA. Nathaniel was afarmer but had o nly personal property valued at $500. The two oldestsons were farm la borers. No other Chilcotes lived in that county.
Bef 1868 Paris, Edgar Co, IL
From Cases at Law and in Chancery in the Supreme Court of Illinois:
Nathaniel G. Chilcote
William Kile et al.
1868. Chilcote v. Kile et al.
Syllabus. Statement of the case. Opinion of the Court.
1. Statement of fraud-A parol promise to pay the debt of a thirdperson , or perform some collateral act by which payment of the debtcan be ob tained, with no consideration to support it, is void.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Edgar county ; the Hon. James Steele,J udge, presiding.
This was an action of assumpsit, brought by the appellee against theap pellant, in the Edgar county Circuit Court. The declarationcontained t he common counts, to which a plea of the general issue wasfiled, with a n agreement that any facts might be given in evidence,which would be c ompetent under special pleas. The case was tried bythe court, a jury b eing waived, and a judgment rendered for plaintifffor $109.00. The fac ts in the case are fully stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Scholfield & Eads, for the appellant.
Messrs. Tajstneb & Ficklin, for the appellees.
Mr. Justice Walker delivered the opinion of the Court :
In this case it appears that one Lowry owed appellant two hundreddolla rs, and appellees had received Lowry's wool for shipment andsale, on w hich they had made advancements.
Appellant drew an order for the two hundred dollars on Lowry, in favoro f appellees, who agreed to save the money for him, if it was in thewoo l, over and above the sums advanced to Lowry, up to the date ofthe ord er. Appellees loaned one hundred dollars to appellant, whichhe was to p ay in a few days, but never did, but claims that "Walkeragreed to turn i t on the order drawn on Lowry ; this Walker denies.Appellant insists t hat Kile accepted the order unconditionally, butthis Kile denies. The o rder was never presented to Lowry byappellees.
There is no claim that appellant owed appellees at the time the orderw as given, or that they had anj interest in the matter. They weremerely a cting as the agents of appellant, for his accommodation, and,so far as w e can see, without compensation. Tliat appellant wasliable to appellee s for the payment of the one hundred dollars wliichhe borrowed of them , there can be no doubt, unless they have renderedthemselves liable fo r the two hundred dollars, and it can beinterposed as a set-off to the ir claim. Did they, then, renderthemselves liable for its payment, at a ll events ?
It is not claimed that appellees have any portion of Lowry's money int heir hands, having' paid to him, or on his order, all that theyreceive d from the wool. But it is insisted that appellees did notreceive the v alue of the wool when it was sold, or at least did nothave it shipped t o the market indicated by Lowry, and from a mistakein addressing a let ter to the consignees, a sale was delayed and wasmade at a lower price t han could have been otherwise had. Admittingthis all to be true, we ar e at a loss to see how that could, in anymanner, render appellees resp onsible to answer for the loss toappellant. If guilty of negligence an d improper conduct, it would nodoubt render them liable to Lowry, but t hey were not liable to, norhad they contracted with, appellant, for th e sale of this wool. Hewas a stranger to the transaction, and they wer e not liable to renderto him an account of their
agency in the matter.
Again, appellant only handed the order to appellees without seeingLowr y, or procuring his acceptance, and we do not find, from theevidence, t hat they agreed to present it for that
purpose. They only agreed to pay it if there was a surplus of theproce eds of the wool over and above the payment of their advances.And it mu st be understood, that it would
only be with the consent of Lowry. But appellant did not procure thata ssent by an acceptance of the order, or otherwise. He, no doubt,expect ed appellees to present it, but they had not so agreed, andshould not b e liable for the amount by failing to present it. Theyseem only to Hav e acted as a matter of favor and kindness toappellant, and not as a ma tter of interest or profit to themselves.Even had they agreed to prese nt the order for acceptance and failedto do so, it is by no means clea r that they would have renderedthemselves liable
for the amount.
Appellant still retains his claim against Lowry, unimpaired and infull f orce, so far as this record discloses. He has, it is true, beendisappo inted in its collection in this mode. Had
he procured Lowry's acceptance, and appellees had received the orderth us accepted, they might have been liable, as then Lowry would haveowed a ppellees, and not appellant, and he would have had no power orcontrol o ver the demand, but it is otherwise in this case. Theyreceived no cons ideration to support a promise to pay the debt ofLowry to appellant. I t
was a naked promise, gratuitously made to appellant, and they are notb ound by it. Appellant could, after the arrangement was made, havesued a nd recovered his debt from Lowry, precisely as though it hadnever been e ntered into by the parties. Had Lowry been released, andappellees agre ed, in consideration of the release, to pay the debt, adifferent quest ion would have been presented, but still that mightnot have been free f rom doubt. As the facts are presented in thiscase, we must, however, h old that appellees did not become liable topay the Lowry debt to appel lant, and the judajment of the court belowmust be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
6/22/1870 City of Paris, Edgar Co, IL. Nathaniel Chilcoat, 54, wasco unted as a farmer in the census but had no real estate, onlypersonal p roperty worth $800. Living with him were his wife and 4nearly grown c hildren: Elizabeth, 58, Allen, 22, Prudence A, 21,David, 19, and Emor y, 16. The last two children were born in OH,that rest of the family i n PA. Allen's occupation was teachingschool. They were the only Chilc ote family in the county.
6/19/1880 Elbridgte Twp, Edgar Co, IL. That year N G Chilcoat, 63,and E lizabeth, 66, lived alone, both with health problems thatprevented the m from working during the past year, he "while swelling," she from hear t disease. He was still listed as a farmer though.Daughter Prudence, 2 9, was a servant in the family of M and EllenCapbell family, same town ship.
Newark, Licking Co, OH where he died.
When he and Elizabeth went back to OH, some of the children remainedin I L, Allen became a Chicago attorney, according to descendants.
